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ARTICLES
The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory
Analysis of the Congressional Response to
Judicial Interpretation
Ronald D. Rotunda*
I. INTRODUIION
The Civil Rights Act of 19911 provides an interesting case
study of the importance and the ambivalence of legislative history,
but it is much more than that. It reflects the apparent congressio-
nal preference for statutory ambiguity, which grows out of the
need of many politicians to be all things to all people. The result
is that Congress ends up delegating important law-making power
to the courts, without supplying adequate standards for the exer-
cise of that power. Subsequently, some of the same people who
delegated this power will later complain that the courts, when
interpreting these vague statutes, are inattentive to the congressio-
nal will, a will that Congress did not make known. As Will Rogers
once said, "The minute you read something you can't understand,
you can almost be sure that it was drawn up by a lawyer."
Several decades ago, as politicians and the general public
were debating the merits of the Vietnam War, one person said,
"We should just declare victory and leave." Participants from each
side could then claim that they had won the war. In a sense, that
anecdote shares an important similarity with the Civil Rights Act
yof 1991. With its passage, each side declared victory. It is now left
to the courts and the litigants to engage in the mopping-up opera-
tion, to determine what this new law really means. The parties are
not unarmed in fighting these inevitable legal battles. The legisla-
tors thoughtfully left each party weapons for the fight, weapons in
the form of vague statements in the legislative history. As I explain
* Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. I
thank Elaine Chin, J.D., University of Chicago, LL.M. Candidate, University of Illinois,
who is the Smart N. Greenberger Research Assistant, for her help.
1 Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. (Supp. III 1992)).
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later, the courts should cautiously and guardedly approach this
legislative history.
Our story begins during an eight-week period in the summer
of 1989, when the Supreme Court handed down seven employ-
ment discrimination cases that interpreted various civil rights stat-
utes in ways that were restrictive to plaintiffs.2 Julius Chambers of
the NAACP deplored the Supreme Court Term, calling it one of
the worst "that we have experienced . . . in our lifetime and it has
been and will be devastating to victims of employment discrimina-
tion."' Both houses of Congress responded to these decisions by
passing the Civil Rights Act of 1990, reversing at least five of these
Supreme Court employment discrimination cases. In addition, this
proposed law explicitly provided for its retroactive application to
fact situations that occurred before the bill became law and to
cases then pending on appeal.4
Commentators called the 1990 Act "a dramatic and far-reach-
ing retort to the Supreme Court."' However, it never became law
because President Bush vetoed it on October 22, 1990. The Senate
failed to override that veto by on!y one vote. Unlike horseshoes
(or hand grenades), Congress gets no credit for coming close. To
fail to override the veto by one vote is still a complete failure.
President Bush's veto message did not oppose the goal of
eliminating discrimination, an antediluvian position to take. On
the contrary, he called discrimination on the basis of race, nation-
al origin, sex, religion, or disability "worse than wrong. It is a
fundamental evil that tears at the fabric of our society, and one
2 Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989); Jett v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T, 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
In addition to these cases, § 102 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. III 1992),
overruled a long line of precedents going back to Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156
(1981). Lehman, and cases in its wake, had held that there are no jura/ trials in Title VII
cases. That is no longer the rule. See infra text accompanying note 9.
3 Julius L Chambers, Twenty-Five Years of the Civil Rights Act: History and Promise, 25
WAKE FoRFsT L REv. 159, 173 (1990); see Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates
Procedure Martin v. Wilks and the Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees,
77 CoRNELL L REV. 189, 190 (1992).
4 Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 22 (1992); Michele
A. Estrin, Note, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases 90
MicH. L REv. 2035, 2035 (1992).
5 John J. Ross, The Emplkyment-Law Year in Review (1991-1992), in EMPLoYMENT LITI-
GATION 1992, at 2 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 5137,
1992).
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that all Americans should and must oppose.6 But, in his view, the
flaw of this proposed statute was that it created inducements for
quotas. The bill, Bush said, "employs a maze of highly legalistic
language to introduce the destructive force of quotas into our
Nation's employment system."
7
The Civil Rights Act of 1990 did not, in its own terms, pro-
vide for quotas. Opponents were concerned, however, that this bill
created a labyrinth of complicated new procedural rules, providing
for presumptions of discrimination whenever a plaintiff found a
sufficient statistical disparity in the sexual, religious, ethnic, or
racial makeup of the employer's work force. The new rules also
shifted the burden of proof to the employer. Faced with these
procedural disadvantages, opponents feared that employers would
prefer to institute de facto quotas rather than litigate what the law
actually meant:
Primarily through provisions governing cases in which employ-
ment practices are alleged to have unintentionally caused the
disproportionate exclusion of members of certain groups, [the
Civil Rights Act of 1990] creates powerful incentives for em-
ployers to adopt hiring and promotion quotas. These incentives
are created by the bill's new and very technical rules of litiga-
tion, which will make it difficult for employers to defend legiti-
mate employment practices. In many cases, a defense against
unfounded allegations will be impossible. Among other prob-
lems, the plaintiff often need not even show that any of the
employer's practices caused a significant statistical disparity. In
other cases, the employer's defense is confined to an unduly
narrow definition of "business" necessity that is significantly
more restrictive than that established by the Supreme Court in
Griggs and in two decades of subsequent decisions. Thus, un-
able to defend legitimate practices in court, employers will be
driven to adopt quotas in order to avoid liability.'
President Bush's veto message urged Congress to consider a new
bill that he was proposing. The Administration bill, he argued,
would meet the goal of overturning various Supreme Court deci-
sions. Also, by rejecting "certain critical language," it would avert
6 Message to the Senate Returning without Approval the Civil Rights Act of 1990,
1990 PUB. PAPERs II 1437, 1437 (Oct. 22, 1990).
7 Id. at 1438.
8 Id
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"years--perhaps decades-of uncertainty and expensive litiga-
tion. "9
On the first day of the next Congress, Representative Brooks,
joined by many other members of the House, introduced H.R. 1,
the Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act of
1991.1' This new bill added two 1991 Supreme, Court decisions to
the list of pro-employer decisions that the new legislation would
correct." After much debate, Congress produced the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, which President Bush signed on November 21, 1991.
The President warned that some provisions in Title III, purporting
to require the courts to defer to congressional fact findings and
other sections affecting members in the Executive Branch, raise
constitutional concerns. He concluded, however, that the law on
the whole promotes "the goals of ridding the workplace of dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, national
origin, and disability," without "lead[ing] to quotas" or "creat[ing]
incentives for needless litigation."12
Controversy arose immediately. Each side claimed victoryis
Supporters of the earlier bill (as well as some of its opponents)
accused the President of caving in, while supporters of the Pres-
ident praised the effort to protect civil rights without a bill that
would create, encourage, or protect quotas. In the words of legal
journalist Stuart Taylor, this was a "classic, convoluted legislative
deal." 4 The people who pay the costs of such a deal are those
whom the law regulates, both employers and employees."5
9 Id.
10 H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 14, 16 (1991), rrnrinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 554-55 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 40].
11 West Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
12 Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 1991 PuB. PAPERS II 1504
(Nov. 21, 1991).
13 Ross, supra note 5, at 3; Bruce Fein, Time Bombs In Rights Bil4 WASH. TIMES, Nov.
4, 1991, at El (Bush was outfoxed by the Democrats); C. Boyden Gray, Civil Rights: We
Won, They Capi!ate, WASH. PosT, Nov. 14, 1991, at A23 (President Bush did not "cave"
or "surrender" on quotas); William T. Coleman, Jr. & Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., How the
Civil Rights Bill Was Really Passed, WASH. PoST, Nov. 18, 1991, at A21 (arguing that Gray
misrepresents the bill's strong protections); see also White House Announces Civil Rights
Compromise Ending Two-Year Long Dispute, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) at A20
(Oct. 28, 1991) (quoting President Bush, "We didn't cave." 'his is not a quota bill;"
and Sen. Kennedy, 'The administration retreated. They finally stopped playing the quota
card.").
14 Stuart Taylor, The Civil Rights Bilk Punt to the Courts, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 4, 1991,
at 25.
15 The employees, in this case, can include employees of the House and Senate. In
[Vol. 68:923
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The Civil Rights Act of 1991 has already resulted in a great
deal of litigation which could have been avoided if Congress had
only articulated its positions more clearly. I realize that it is often
impossible for legislation to anticipate every possible scenario, but
a basic fact is that Congress did anticipate-but chose to ig-
nore-some important issues involving the 1991 Act.
The hard fact of political life is that, in order to draft a bill
that can pass both Houses of Congress and garner a presidential
signature, it is sometimes politic to leave some things unsaid. But
that political decision is also a judgment to delegate those matters
to the courts without much direction. If the courts respond by
decisions that are not as favorable as Congress would have liked,
or use rules of statutory interpretation with which Congress dis-
agrees, 6 then Congress, rather than pointing the finger of blame
to the courts, should look into the mirror.
Like planned obsolescence, planned ambiguity has unavoid-
able costs which the consumers of the product must pay. The
inherent result of planned ambiguity in the 1991 Act is unnec-
essary make-work for lawyers. In particular, Congress chose not to
define a crucial term used throughout employment discrimination
cases-the defense of "justified by business necessity." Similarly,
Congress did not articulate whether the new law should apply
retroactively. Which provisions of the Act, if any, apply to alleged
employment discrimination that occurred prior to the time that
the Act became law? To what extent should the new law apply to
cases already in the trial courts or pending on appeal? Congress
chose not to deal with these questions as well. Perhaps We should
not be too surprised. These are some of the same people who tell
an unusual break with standard operating procedure, the House and Senate covered its
own employees, though Congress applied special rules and' procedures so that the
protections that the law offers private employees, and the burdens that the law places on
private employers, are greater than the protections and burdens that Congress is willing
to place on itself. See § 117, 2 U.S.C. §§ 601, 1201-1224 (Supp. III 1992) (the House).
Both the House and the Senate specifically reserved the power to change the law applica-
ble to it by exercising its rule-making power, without having to pass any additional legis-
lation. Id. § 117(a)(2)(C), §§ 314, 324(b).
Each House of Congress reserves the power to decide for itself the means of en-
forcement. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 10, at 95-96, 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. at 633-34.
16 The draft Civil Rights Bill proposed to codify various rules of statutory interpre-
tation. See H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 10, at 87-89. 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 625-27, dis-
cussing the "need to codify certain rules of statutory construction." Id. The enacted bill
did not contain the proposed sections.
1993]
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us that this country has too many laws, but they always know of at
least one more law that should be passed.
The result of this ambiguity is increased and burdensome
litigation for both employers and employees. The new law increas-
es, rather than decreases, legal uncertainty. The unfortunate by-
product of the mandated ambiguities of the 1991 Act is increased
transaction costs in the form of litigation. If I may switch from the
language of economics to the language of sports, Congress chose
to punt.
Congress can certainly be specific if it wants to be, as illus-
trated by an ironic (that is, "ironic" in the sense of "paradoxical,"
not in the sense of "humorous") fact regarding the 1991 Act.
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio17 was the main decision that pre-
cipitated the congressional reaction. The plaintiffs in this case
were approximately two thousand Asian-American cannery workers
who, for nearly two decades, have been litigating race discrimina-
tion claims against their employers. The 1991 Act specifically ex-
cludes Wards' Cove from its coverage.'" This is the first time that
Congress has ever engaged in a case-specific exclusion in any civil
rights legislation.19 Although Congress made clear that the new
law does not apply to a particular pending case, as to other cases,
it chose not to address the question of retroactivity.
Let us now consider the eight areas within the 1991 Act in
which Congress reversed various Supreme Court decisions dealing
with employment discrimination.
II. DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS
A. Background
Griggs v. Dukes Power Co.2" was the first Supreme Court case
to hold that an employer's facially neutral policy, instituted with
no intent to discriminate, may violate Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 solely because that policy has a disproportionate im-
17 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
18 Section 402(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. III 1992). See infa note 85 for a full
discussion of the special exception for Wards Cove.
19 See Grace M. Kang, Workers Fight to Have Bias Suit Covered by 1991 Civil Rights Act,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1992, at B14. Wards Cove paid its Washington, D.C. lobbyists
$175,000 to obtain this exemption. Id. Senator Brock Adams and Representative Jim
McDermott have introduced the Justice for Wards Cove Workers Act, S. 1962 & H.R. 3748,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), seeking to strike this clause from the Civil Rights Act of
1991.
20 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
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pact on a protected class. As Chief Justice Burger explained in
Griggs, "good intent or absence of discriminatory. intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that oper-
ate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability."21 Thus, once a complainant showed dispa-
rate impact, the facially neutral employment practice at issue, such
as a weight requirement or an aptitude test, was an unlawful viola-
tion of Title VII, unless "business necessity" required it.' If the
employer mounts a successful "business necessity" defense, the
complainant could then show that alternative, less discriminatory
business practices could be used." Griggs and its offspring en-
abled a number of plaintiffs to prevail in employment discrimina-
tion cases, even though they could not show intentional dis-
crimination.
At first, the Court applied the Griggs rule to cases involving
objective job requirements, such as height and weight restrictions,
or facially objective, but arbitrary tests.24 For example, a job re-
quirement that employees be at least six feet tall has a disparate
impact on women, who tend to be shorter than men. Unless busi-
ness necessity justified this height requirement, Title VII prohibit-
ed it. Similarly, Title VII allows the employer to use an objective
written test, even though the test has a disparate or disproportion-
ate impact on a protected class of workers, if the test is validated.
A test is validated if it is scientifically shown that the test is "pre-
dictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of
work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs
for which candidates are being evaluated."'
21 Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
22 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); accord Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 328, 331-32 n.14 (1977) (holding that Title VII eliminated "unnecessary
barriers" that are not "essential to effective job performance").
23 H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 10, at 24-25, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 562-63.
24 Compare the Court's position here with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244
(1976). In Davis, the Court agreed that a verbal, reading, and comprehension test, which
had a disparate impact on black police candidates, would be invalid under Title VII be-
cause it had not been validated." There was no scientific proof that the people who did
better on the examination would be better police officers than the people who did less
well on it. The majority concluded, however, that the Equal Protection or Due Process
Clauses would not prohibit this test because it was racially neutral on its face and was
not instituted for racially discriminatory purposes. Id. at 245-46.
25 A/henabe, 422 U.S at 431 (quoting, with approval, federal equal employment
guidelines).
1993]
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In 1988, the Court, with no majority opinion, expanded the
Griggs rule so that it applied to subjective employment practices,
such as job interviews, which are facially neutral, but can have a
disparate impact on a protected class of workers.26 In so doing,
Justice O'Connor cautioned that:
[t]he inevitable focus on statistics in disparate impact cases
could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate
prophylactic measures .... [E]xtending disparate impact anal-
ysis to subjective employment practices has the potential to
create a Hobson's choice for employers and thus to lead in
practice to perverse results. If quotas and preferential treatment
become the only cost-effective means of avoiding expensive
litigation and potentially catastrophic liability, such measures
will be widely adopted. The prudent employer will be careful
to ensure that its programs are discussed in euphemistic terms,
but will be equally careful to ensure that the quotas are met.
27
Lower courts applied and expanded Griggs.2' For example, in
Green v. USX Corp.,' the Third Circuit considered a case where
those in charge of hiring used multiple criteria that were so sub-
jective that a complainant could not determine the weight given
to any one criterion. Multiple interviewers each used their own
subjective criteria, with few, if any, guidelines to follow. Top man-
agement made little effort to determine what criteria were being
used and whether they were job related. Applicants for these un-
skilled entry-level positions were subjected to a hiring process in
which age, sex, and relatives in the company were to be listed on
the applications. Applicants who had relatives at the plant were
put in one folder, and all other applicants in another. When posi-
tions came open, some applications were pulled from each file for
interviewing. No one had ever failed to meet the minimum re-
quirements (no experience necessary, willing to train, common
sense, and a desire to work). The all-white interviewers hired only
seventeen percent blacks, although nearly thirty percent of the
applicants were black. The court agreed that it would be difficult
or impossible to isolate and prove which factor or factors led to
this result, but it rejected a rule that would preclude challenge to
a multicomponent system. The court held that such a doctrine
26 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
27 Id. at 992-93 (O'Connor, J., for the plurality).
28 Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Sodal Progress and Subjective Judgments,
63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 10-11 n.53 (1987).
29 843 F.2d 1511 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated, 490 U.S. 1103 (1989).
[Vol. 68:923
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would be "wholly incompatible with Griggs."' Thus, even a
complainant's failure to isolate and identify the cause of a dispa-
rate impact would not be fatal to plaintiff's case.
In June 1989, the Supreme Court decided Wards Cove Packing
Co., Inc. v. Atonio.s1 Wards Cove operated Alaskan salmon canner-
ies in which nonwhites (Chinese, Japanese, Samoan, Filipino, and
Alaskan native) predominately held the low-paying, unskilled can-
nery jobs. Predominately white workers filled the skilled,
noncannery positions. The nonwhite workers contended that com-
pany hiring and promotion practices created absolute barriers to
the higher paying noncannery jobs. For example, the company did
not announce noncannery openings to cannery workers, but relied
on word of mouth for recruitment. This policy disadvantaged
nonwhites, who were less likely to get the word. In addition, the
nonwhite workers claimed racial slurs were pervasive and that the
employer provided segregated room and board accommodations.
The Ninth Circuit held that the nonwhite workers made out a
prima fade case of disparate impact in hiring. In so ruling, the
court relied solely on statistics that showed a high percentage of
nonwhite workers in cannery jobs and a low percentage in
noncannery positions. The court further concluded that once the
plaintiffs had shown disparate impact of an employment practice,
the burden then shifted .to the employer to prove the practice's
business necessity.
A divided Supreme Court reversed. First, the Court held that
plaintiffs do not make a prima fade case of disparate impact by
comparing the percentage of nonwhite cannery workers to the
percentage of noncannery workers who were nonwhite. Instead, the
proper comparison is between "the racial composition of the at-
issue jobs and the'racial composition of the qualified population
in the relevant labor market." 2 The employer, after all, hires its
employees from the qualified population in the relevant market.
The majority reasoned that the court of appeal's method of
comparison would lead to a proliferation of lawsuits against any
employer with a racially imbalanced segment of its workforce. The
threat of expensive litigation whenever there is racial imbalance
would encourage many employers to adopt racial quotas, as less
expensive than litigation. Thus, the Court concluded that plaintiffs
30 Id. at 1521.
31 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
82 Id. at 650.
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must specifically show that identifiable practices have had a signifi-
cantly disparate impact.
Next, the Court held that after the plaintiff establishes a prima
fade disparate impact case with respect to specific employment
practices, the plaintiff still has the burden of persuasion. The
Court interpreted earlier decisions referring to an employer's
"burden of proof," for the business justification defense, to mean
a burden of production, not persuasion. The Court then ex-
plained:
[I]f on remand [the workers] cannot persuade the trier of fact
on the question of [the employer's] business necessity defense,
[the workers] may still be able to prevail. To do so, [the
workers] will have to persuade the factfinder that "other
tests ... would also serve the employer's legitimate inter-
est[s]." . . . Moreover, "factors such as the cost or other bur-
dens of proposed alternative selection devices are relevant."ss
This standard was more favorable to employers than the test that
many of the lower courts were applying because it raised the issue
of alternative costs and "other burdens," which effectively gave the
employer a second line of defense.
In comparison to the way that many lower courts had been
applying Griggs and its progeny, Wards Cove altered the law of
disparate impact analysis in three ways. First, it required a com-
plainant to isolate and identify particular employment practices
responsible for any disparate impact.'M In contrast, the Green case,
discussed earlier,'5 had considered it incompatible with Griggs to
disallow challenges to multicomponent systems in which particular
practices could not be identified as causing a distinct impact.'
Second, the Court set out a reasonableness standard for the
business necessity test. The question is "whether a challenged
practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment
goals of the employer" 7 The employer's business necessity must
now be "reasonable" rather than "compelling." The Court rejected
the requirement that the employer demonstrate that the chal-
lenged practice is "essential" or "indispensable" to the business.
The majority, citing Griggs and similar precedent,' concluded
33 Id. at 661 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 997, 998
(1988) (plurality opinion)).
34 Id at 657.
35 See supra text accompanying footnotes 29-30.
36 Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated 490 U.S. 1103 (1989).
37 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658.
38 The Court also cited Watson, 487 U.S. at 997 (plurality opinion); New York City
[V/ol. 68:923
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that this "degree of scrutiny would be almost .impossible for most
employers to meet, and would result in a host of evils," such as de
facto quotass 9 Lower courts that have adopted the requirement
that the business necessity must be "compelling" have acknowl-
edged that the employer has a significant burden of proof.'
Third, Wards Cove held that the employer has only the burden
of production, not the burden of persuasion, in establishing an af-
firmative defense of business- necessity. The House Report termed
this "a dramatic departure from long-standing precedent."4' Many
defense practitioners had also thought that the employer had the
obligation to justify the challenged practice." Interestingly, Presi-
dent Bush did not object to putting the burden of proof on the
defendant-employer as to the business necessity defense.4"
B. Multiple Employment Practices Resulting
I in a Disparate Impact
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 rejects many, but not all, of the
principles that the majority had adopted in Wards Cove Section
105(a)" retains the requirement of Wards Cove that a complain-
ant isolate particular practices causing disparate impact. It allows
the parties, however, to view the entire decision-making process as
one employment practice if the complaining party shows that one
cannot separate the elements of an employer's decisionmaking
process analytically. The Act is broad enough to cover the situa-
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979). Justice Stevens, dissenting in
Wards Cove, agreed that Griggs allowed "any valid business purpose" as a defense. Wards
Cove, 490 U.S. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
40 Shortly after Griggs, the Fourth Circuit created a widely accepted test for business
necessity. Id. The test provided that a challenged employment practice must effectively
carry out a sufficiently compelling business purpose to override any racial impact. The
court admitted that this balancing test placed a significant burden on employers. Robin-
son v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 797-800 (4th Cir. 1971).
41 H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 10, at 29, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 567.
42 For example, N. Thompsqn Powers, a corporate attorney, testified: "I would con-
cede that as a defense practitioner, I certainly thought that prior to Watson. . . and
Wards Cove... once disparate impact was established .... I had the burden of justifying
the challenged practice." Hearings on 1990 Civil Rights Act Before the Comm. on Education &9
Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 649 (1990), quoted in, H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 10, at
28, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 566.
43 Memorandum for the President from Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, on
the "Civil Rights Act' of 1990," at 2 (Oct. 22, 1990) (on file with the Notre Dame Law
Review).
44 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (B) (Supp. III 1992).
1993] 933
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tion where interaction of two or more components in hiring or
promotion causes the adverse impact. As in Green, hiring processes
are often complicated, with ill-defined or ill-followed guidelines. In
Grig itself, two separate tests were required for employee ad-
vancement, yet the Supreme Court had not required data re-
garding the distinct impact of each test.
C. Burden of Proof
Sections 104 and 105 place the burden of proof on the defen-
dant-employer, who must prove that its practices are job related
and consistent with business necessity. These sections reject Wards
Cove and instead provide that where an employee has shown that
an employment practice causes a disparate impact, both the bur-
den of production and the burden of persuasion shift to the em-
ployer. The employer then must show that the practice is both
job-related and consistent with business necessity. Section 104
defines "demonstrates" to mean "meets the burdens of production
and persuasion."' Congress emphasized that it thought that
Wards Cove had changed the law, not merely clarified it, for sec-
tion 105 provides that the demonstration required "shall be in
accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect
to the concept of 'alternative employment practice. "'46 The Su-
preme Court decided Wards Cove on June 5, 1989.
The new law places the burden of proof on the defendant
because it is the defendant, not the plaintiff, that usually has easy
access to the necessary information. It is the employer, not the
employee, who adopted the challenged practices, who is familiar
with the proper requirements needed for the job at issue, who
should be aware of the relative costs and benefits of the practices
chosen, and who knows why it chose not to use alternative practic-
es. In addition, because it is always difficult to prove a negative, it
is too heavy a burden for the employer to prove that "there is no
business justification whatsoever for an employment practice."47
D. Disparate Impact and the Role of Statistics
Congress did not change the Wards Cove rule regarding the
proof of "disparate impact." In fact, the new law codifies the tests
45 Id. § 2000e-2(m).
46 Id.
47 H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 10, at 30, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 568 (emphasis in
original).
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that the Court used in the Wards Cove majority and prior cases.
First, there is an "unlawful employment practice" on the grounds
of "disparate impact" only in the following circumstances: the
plaintiff must demonstrate-has the burden of production and of
persuasion-that the employer uses an employment practice that
"causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."' Second, the employer must fail to demon-
strate that the challenged practice is related to the job and is con-
sistent with "business necessity. "49
E. Causation
Causation is crucial. If the employer demonstrates that an
employment practice "does not cause the disparate impact," then
the employer need not also show that "business necessity" justifies
the practice.' If the plaintiff challenges several employment prac-
tices, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that "each particular
challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact," unless
the plaintiff can prove that the elements "are not capable of sepa-
ration."51 Only if the elements are inseparable, "may" the court
analyze the decision-making process as one employment practice.
In proving causation, the plaintiff does not make a prima fade
case of disparate impact "merely by showing that an employer had
a smaller proportion of minority or women employees than exist-
ed in the population as a whole." 2 The House Report on the
1991 Act, in explaining that the Act does not change the law on
this issue, quoted Wards Cove favorably when it said that the "prop-
er comparison [is] between the racial composition of [obs at-is-
sue] and the racial composition of the qualified population in the
relevant labor market." 3 If the employer is looking for unskilled
workers, then it should be appropriate to compare the group
selected to the general working age population. Otherwise, it is
not proper to compare the general population to the group that
the employer actually selects, because the employer does not draw
the employees from the general population but from the qualified
48 Id.
49 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (Supp. 111 1992) (emphasis added).
50 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii).
51 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
52 H.R. REP. No. 40, .supra note 10, at 32, 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. at 570.
53 Id. at 33, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 571 (quoting Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650 (quoting
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977))).
1993]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
labor pool. Often, the court should look "to the proportion of the
applicants who were minorities or women. " 5
F. The Failure to Define "Business Necessity"
A crucial concept in the application of this law is the term
"business necessity." What does it mean? One of the specific artic-
ulated purposes of the new law is "to codify the concepts of 'busi-
ness necessity and job related'" as enunciated by the Supreme
Court case law prior to Wards Cove55 The Act does not define
this critical phrase, however, although a section of the law refers
to some legislative history to which courts are directed to refer."
If the employment practice involved hiring, transfer, promo-
tion, training, and the like, the House Report proposed defining
"business necessity" as a practice that "must bear a significant rela-
tionship to the successful performance of the job."17 In all other
cases not relating to job selection, the House Report proposed
that the practice in question "must bear a significant relationship
to a significant business objective of the employer."58
54 Id. at 33, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 571.
55 Section 3(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. III 1992).
56 Id. § 105(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 105(b) contains an unusual statutory pro-
vision, stating that:
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at 137
Cong. Rec. S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative his-
tory of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or apply-
ing, any provisions of this Act that relate to Wards Cove-Business necessi-
ty/cumulation/alternative business practice.
Id. At the appropriate place in the Congressional Record, one finds a three paragraph
memorandum. The first paragraph states that it is a "final compromise" agreed to by
"several Senate sponsors, including Senators Danforth, Kennedy, Dole, and the Adminis-
tration." 137 CONG. REc. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991). The last two paragraphs are
no Rosetta Stone. They state:
The terms "business necessity" and "job related" are intended to reflect the
concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and in
the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.
When a decision-maklng process includes particular, functionally-integrated
practices which are components of the same criterion, standard, method of ad-
ministration, or test, such as the height and weight requirements designed to
measure strength in Dothard v. Rawlinson, the particular functionally-integrated
practices may be analyzed as one employment practice.
Id. (citation omitted).
57 H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 10, at 34, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 572.
58 Id. at 34, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 572. This test would have been found in § 701(o),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The law, as enacted, added several subsections to § 701, but
stopped at subsection "n." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. III 1992).
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An example of an employment practice that does not relate
to job selection would be a rule that all employees who work
outdoors cannot use indoor toilet facilities. In a case where the
employer had instituted such a rule, it had a disparate impact on
female employees, who experienced medical problems from using
unsanitary outdoor facilities.5 9 The court prohibited the require-
ment because the employer was unable to prove that "the practice
of furnishing unsanitary toilet facilities at the work site 'substantial-
ly promoted the proficient operation of the business."' ° The
House Report cites this lowr court case with approval, but the
enacted version of the law does not consider the question.61
Because Congress was unable to agree to the proposal that
the House Report presented, it did not define a crucial term in
disparate impact cases. Instead, Congress left that issue to future
litigation, and delegated .to the Court the power to breathe life
into the defense of "business necessity---to either narrow its pro-
tective umbrella or expand it. It was Congress, not the Court, that
created a vacuum and invited the judiciary to fill it. Congress
could have overturned, modified, or elaborated on the Wards Cove
test for "business necessity," but it did not do so. The only reason
that the buck stops with the Supreme Court on this issue is that
Congress chose to pass the buck.
Now, if one or more Congressmen criticize the Court for the
way it later defines that term, the Congressmen should first criti-
cize Congress for its avoidance of the issue. It is not logical for
Congress to give the Court carte blanche power to deal with a prob-
lem, and then criticize that Court for exercising that power in a
carte blanche way, anymore than it is not logical to give someone a
blank check and then object that the amount the person wrote on
that check was too large.6"
59 Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1987). Compare this with EEOC v.
Ball, 661 F.2d 531, 540-41 (6th Cir. 1981), where the court upheld an employer lunch
policy that had a disparate impact on women. The employer showed that the demands
of the jobs dominated by women required a lunch policy that was different than the
lunch policy applied to other jobs.
The issue of non-selection employment practices that cause a disparate impact does
not relate to the question of so-called "comparable worth" claims, which this civil rights
law did not address. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 10, at 37, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 575.
60 Freeman, 817 F.2d at 388.
61 H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 10, at 37, 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. at 575.
62 Congressional silence also serves to delegate more law-making power to the agen-
des that have jurisdiction to enforce the law. The EEOC issued two memoranda on July
7, 1992, attempting to clarify the new law. EEOC Staff Policy Memos Intaret 1991 Civil
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When Congress writes unnecessarily vague laws, it is not solv-
ing problems but creating them. It is a little like the new worker
who was had been loafing most of the year. Realizing that it was
almost time for a raise, the new worker asked an older worker:
"Do you think that if I work really hard for the next two weeks,
I'll get a good raise? "Well," the veteran worker replied, "you
make me think of a thermometer in a cold room. You can make
it register higher by holding your hand over it, but you won't be
warming the room." The unnecessarily vague law is a superficial
solution that does not solve the problem, just as holding your
hand over the thermometer does not warm the room.
III. RACIAL HARASSMENT
The "business necessity" defense does not apply to cases of
intentional discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national
origin, or religion.' If an employer has requirements that are
not discriminatory on their face, the results of these requirements
may show a disparate impact. The law, however, simply forbids
intentional discrimination outright, because there is -never a busi-
ness necessity to justify that. There may be some circumstances
where a particular characteristic may be a bona fide occupational
qualification. As Justice Marshall has noted, the bona fide occu-
pational qualification in the context of a sex discrimination lawsuit
is "applicable only to job situations that require specific physical
characteristics necessarily possessed by only one sex." 4 For exam-
ple, it is not sex discrimination for a theater to employ male ac-
tors to play male parts and female actors to play female roles.
Rights A4, 61 U.S.L.W. 2029 (July 14, 1992). These memoranda outlined its new policies
on disparate treatment and compensatory and punitive damages. The first memorandum
adopted a recent line of decisions upholding the employer if it discovers some basis after
the fact that would have served as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing the
employee (e.g., r~sum6 fraud discovered after a discriminatorily motivated discharge). Al-
so, the EEOC stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not affect voluntary affirma-
tive action programs. The EEOC said that the sliding scale of caps imposed under the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied to each aggrieved employee. For a workplace with 15 to
100 workers, each worker proving job bias would be entitled to $50,000. EEOC Commis-
sioner Joy Cherian said that its legal staff had "breathed fresh hope of relief for victims
of sexual harassment, and also for victims of racial and ethnic harassment." Id.
63 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(c)(2) (Supp. III 1992).
64 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544-46 (1971).
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One of the primary laws dealing with intentional racial dis-
crimination is section 1981.' Prior to the amendments in the
1991 Act, it provided:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the secu-
rity of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, li-
censes, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.86
This language has survived, with only minor changes, from the
original Civil Rights Act of 1866.67
Most suits brought under section 1981 are employment dis-
crimination suits. Prior to 1989, every federal court of appeals
reaching the question had held that section 1981 prohibited dis-
crimination at the formation of an employment contract and dur-
ing the performance of the contract as well.'
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union69 and ruled to the contrary. Ms. Patterson complained of
"racial harassment."7 She testified that her supervisor "periodical-
ly stared at her for several minutes at a time; that he gave her too
many tasks, causing her to complain that she was under too much
pressure; that among the tasks given her were sweeping and dust-
ing jobs not given to white employees." 71 The supervisor told her
that "blacks are known to work slower than whites."72 Ms.
Patterson also testified that her supervisor "criticized her in staff
meetings while not similarly criticizing white employees." 3
In Patterson, Justice Kennedy held that section 1981 does not
prohibit racial harassment relating to the conditions of employ-
ment because
[t]he right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of
either logic or semantics, to conduct by the employer after the
65 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
66 Id.
67 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
68 H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 10, at 90, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 628.
69 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
70 Id. at 178.
71 Id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir.
1986)).
72 Id.
73 Id.
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contract relation has been established .... Such postformation
conduct does not involve the right to make a contract, but
rather implicates the performance of established contractual
obligations. 74
According to the Court, section 1981 does not govern conduct
that was "postformation," that is, conduct after the contract had
been formed. Instead, such matters are "more naturally governed
by state contract law and Title VII. "7T
Section 101(2) (b) of the 1991 Act responds to Patterson by
prohibiting discrimination on account of race and ethnicity even
in the post-contract-formation period.7' The Act applies specifical-
ly to conditions of work as well as to discriminatory hiring by
defining "make and enforce contracts" to include "the enjoyment
of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual
relationship.
. 77
Although the modern Supreme Court has applied section
1981 to private conduct without any state action,78 Congress en-
acted a new subsection to codify this rule and make it clear that
the protected rights are shielded from impairment by nongovern-
mental entities as well as from impairment under color of state
law.
74 Id. at 188.
75 Id. at 177.
Ms. Patterson also testified that the supervisor passed her over for promotions be-
cause of her race, did not offer her training for higher level jobs, and denied her wage
increases. The Court indicated that if the. plaintiff had claimed that she was not promot-
ed because of race, and the change of position would have entailed a new contract for-
mation, then refusal of the employer to enter into that new contract would violate sec-
tion 1981. Id. at 185. The Court remanded for further proceedings on these other issues.
The trial court eventually dismissed Ms. Patterson's claims on the grounds that the pro-
motion denied her was not "a new and distinct relation with her employer." Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 729 F. Supp. 35, 36 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
McKnight v. G.M. Corp, 908 F.2d 104, 107-8 (7th Cir. 1990), cerL denied 111 S. Ct.
1306 (1991), later held that Patterson applied retroactively to cases pending on appeal.
76 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)-(c) (Supp. III 1992).-
77 Id. § 1981(b).
78 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989) (reaffirming Runyon).
It is interesting that the House Report cited Runyon, but spelled it incorrectly. See
H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 10, at 92, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 630 (referring to "Runyon'
v. McGrary [sic].")
79 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c). The Patterson Court considered, but unanimously rejected, a
proposal to overrule Runyon, by reinterpreting § 1981 to impose a state-action require-
ment. PaUerson, 491 U.S. at 173.
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IV. RETROACUTJ171Y
In addition to expanding the scope of section 1981, Congress
added a new section which provides for punitive damages in cer-
tain instances of intentional discrimination.' Congress, however,
did not explain whether this new punitive damage provision is to
apply retroactively to cases pending at the time the 1991 Civil
-Rights Act became law, or to conduct that occurred before the
enactment of the law. The very last section of the law, section 402,
simply states that, "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, this
Act and the amendment made by this Act shall take affect upon
enactment."
The vetoed 1990 Civil Rights bill contained a clause making it
retroactive.82 The existence of that clause was one of the reasons
that President Bush vetoed the 1990 bill.' Some commentators
have argued that the failure of Congress to enact a specific clause
stipulating retroactivity meant that Congress did not intend the
law to be retroactive. 8' Moreover, some argue that it is unfair for
Congress to provide for the retroactive application of punitive
damages. The purpose of punitive damages is to change behavior,
but it is not fair to apply the punitive damage remedy to actions
that have already passed and were not illegal at the time at which
they took place, that is, before the passage the 1991 Act. If the
facts did not state a cause of action before the enactment of the
1991 Civil Rights Act, then subsequently enacted law should not
apply retroactively to make improper that which was proper as of
the time it occurred.
Others point to a clause that Congress wrote explicitly making
the law not retroactive as to a narrow fact situation-the law will
not apply to the workers who sued in Wards Cove, on remand.'
80 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
81 Id. § 1981 (emphasis added).
82 S. 2104, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990).
83 137 CONG. REc. 515,383 (daily ed. Oct 22, 1990).
84 See Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 976 F.2d 886, 890 (1992).
85 Section 402(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. III 1992), specifically bars the application
of the Act to disparate impact cases if the complaint was filed before March 1, 1975 and
if the initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983. See supra note 19. The pur-
pose of these apparently arbitrary dates is to exclude the plaintiffs in Wards Cove from
benefitting from the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on remand from the Supreme Court. The
employer in that case lobbied Congress for the specific exclusion, which Congress grant-
ed, although the results in that case supposedly inspired Congress to enact new legisla-
tion to help the workers in Wards Cove. See supra note 19.
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Thus, argue these other commentators, Congress must have in-
tended that the law otherwise be retroactive.'
The only thing that is clear is that the legislators were unable
to agree about this question, even though they were aware of it
and had thought about it. 7 By leaving the issue vague, those who
lost on this question in the halls of Congress might have a second
chance to win in the courts.
It is an iron law of statutory interpretation that each litigant
will almost alwvays find some fragment or particle of legislative
history that can be read to lend support to their claims. After you
have heard two eyewitnesses separately describe the same auto
accident, you start to worry about history. We should approach
legislative history with the same degree of skepticism and appre-
hensiveness.
The fact that Congress was deliberately vague does not, of
course, mean that the issue will go away. The courts will jump in
where Congress fears to tread. When Congress avoids the ques-
tion, it creates, in effect, a decision to delegate that issue to the
courts. This is what happened. Like the student who procrastinates
in doing her homework, the homework does not go away, and the
student must still eventually do it. In the case of legislation, how-
ever, procrastination means that Congress (unlike the student) may
be able to avoid entirely the need to decide the issue. Delay
means that the judiciary will make the decision, at least initially.
Congress will only have to deal with the problem, however, if
enough legislators do not like the judiciary's solution.
In the case of the "business necessity" rule, the congressional
decision to avoid a statutory codification of what that rule means
is a decision that leaves courts struggling to create a meaning,
perhaps overturning or restrictively interpreting prior case law on
that issue. The congressional decision to be silent on the retroac-
tivity issue is not really parallel because it does not involve the
courts in interpreting a long series of cases in an effort to define
86 See Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992).
However, others treated the Wards Cove provision as proof that Congress generally
did not intend that the law should be treated as retroactive. Senator Gorton, for exam-
pie, is on record as saying that "the language in question does no more than reaffirm
for one specific case the more general mandate of the bill that the civil rights amend-
ments will be applied prospectively," in Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886,
890 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
87 In Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit admitted:
"[1]f there is anything clear about congressional intent, it is that Congress clearly intend-
ed to leave the question of retroactivity to others." Id. at 194.
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a crucial term. The question of retroactivity is really an "either-or"
decision. The Supreme Court, or the lower courts, if there is no
split in the circuits, will decide that the law is either applied retro-
actively or is not applied retroactively.
Outside of the criminal context, where the Constitution for-
bids retroactive application,ss there is no default rule of statutory
interpretation, no uniform principle regarding the retroactive
application of statutes.8 9 A general rule always requiring prospec-
tive application would force Congress to take responsibility for the
decision regarding the retroactive application of its laws. It would
also reduce the litigation burden on the courts and the parties.'
Instead, Congress chose what one court called "carefully crafted
'ambiguity as to whether Congress intended the Act to be general-
ly retroactive."''
The fact that Congress presented the courts with an "either-
or" decision does not absolve congressional avoidance of the issue.
Rather, it makes congressional avoidance even more inexcusable.
All Congress had to do was make a decision, and it would have
saved a large number of litigants a great deal of money and time
litigating a question to which there is often no simple answer. A
simple legislative decision would have eliminated delay in the
courts, reduced the costs to the litigants and to the judiciary, and
asserted congressional responsibility. Instead, employers, employ-
ees, the EEOC, 2 and the courts, wrestled with the issue, with the
88 U:S. CONSr, art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No state shall . . . pass any .. . ex post facto
law."); U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No . .. ex post facto law shall be passed [by
Congress]."). See generally, 2 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON CON-
sTITUTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.9(b) (2d ed. 1992).
89 On the civil side, the rules of statutory construction are complex. Sw, eg., Bradley
v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974) (Court held that courts should apply an
act to pending cases unless the act provides expressly to the contrary or manifest injus-
tice would result from retroactive application); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488
U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (Court held that a law requires prospective application unless an
act expressly provides for retroactive application).
90 Cf. Daniel Kinsella, The Civil Rights Ad of 1991 and the Retroadivily Mudd 80 ILL.
BJ. 500 (1992).
91 Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 193 (5th Cir. 1992).
92 The EEOC issued a policy statement on December 27, 1991, interpreting the new
law prospectively and ruling that it would not seek damages for events occurring before
November 21, 1991. Civil Rights Amendments Aren't Retroactive, EEOC Says, 60 U.S.LW. 2418
(Jan. 7, 1992); see also EEOC Staff Policy Memos Interpret 1991 Civil Rights Ad, 61 U.S.LW.
2029 (July 14, 1992). The courts have had a mixed reaction to the position of the
EEOC. Vogel v. Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992) (EEOC policy reasonable);
Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 194 (5th Cir. 1992) (same). But see Davis v. City of San
Francisco, 976 F.2d, 1536, 1555 (9th Cir. 1992) (court declines to defer to EEOC).
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trial courts splitting on the question and most courts on the ap-
pellate level eventually deciding that the law is not retroactive.93
93 Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992); accord Hicks v.
Brown Group, 982 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1992), (holding that § 101(2) (b) does not apply
retroactively).
Baynes v. AT&T Technologies, 976 F.2d 1870 (11th Cir. 1992), weighed the nature
of the parties (private parties, "great national concern") and the nature of the parties'
'rights (substantive versus procedural or remedial). The court concluded that the substan-
tive rights of private parties on issues of great national concern weighed against retroac-
tivity.
The Seventh Circuit held that § 101(2)(b) was not retroactive in Mozee v. Ameri-
can Commercial Marine Serv., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992), and in Luddington v. Indi-
ana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1992). In dicta, Mozee proposed that there be a
presumptive retroactive application of procedural amendments and a presumptive pro-
spective application of substantive changes in the law. Mozee, 963 F.2d at 939. Of course,
the distinction between "substance" and "procedure" is not all that clear, as any first year
law student learns by the end of the first semester of civil procedure. Johnson v. Uncle
Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1863 (5th Cir. 1992) (against retroactivity); Rowe v. Sullivan, 967
F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1992) (same).
Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1992), also ruled
against retroactivity, specifically referring to the "convoluted legislative history of this Act,"
and rejecting Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). Davis applied
retroactively the Civil Rights Act with regard to the reimbursement of expert witness fees.
Id at 1549.
The number of court decisions on this one issue is astounding. As of January 1,
1993, the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law listed over 200 cases. See,
e.g., Hughs v. Matthews, No. 92-1620, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32119 (8th Cir. Dec. 8,
1992); Holt v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 974 F.2d 771 (6th Cir. 1992);' Valdez v.
San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, 974 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1992); Wilson v. University
of Tex. Health Ctr., 975 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1992); Huey v. Sullivan, 971 F.2d 1362 (8th
Cir. 1992); Parton v. GTE North, 971 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1992); Wilson v. Belmont
Homes, 970 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1992); Banas v. American Airlines, 969 F.2d 477; Artis v.
Hitachi Zosen Clearing, 967 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. Western & Southern
Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir. 1992); Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104 (7th
Cir. 1992); Williams v. Valentec Kisco, 964 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1992); Valdez v. Mercy
Hosp., 961 F.2d 1401 (8th Cir. 1992); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.
1992); Smith v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 794 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo. 1992); Brown v.
Amoco Oil Co., 793 F. Supp. 846 (N.D. Ind. 1992); Desai v. Siemens Medical Sys., 792 F.
Supp. 1275 (M.D. Fla. 1992); Andrade v. Crawford & Co., 792 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ohio
1992); Garnder v. MCI Telecomuications, 792 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Assily v.
Tampa Gen. Hosp., 791 F. Supp. 862 (M.D. Fla. 1992); Moore v. Burlington N. R.R. Co.,
790 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Craig v. Ohio Dept. of Admin. Servs., 790 F. Supp.
758 (S.D. Ohio 1992); Robinson v. Davis Memorial Goodwill Indus., 790 F. Supp. 325
(D.D.C 1992); Lute v. Consol. Freightways, 789 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Ind. 1992); Sudtelgte
v. Sessions, 789 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Mo. 1992); Lee v. Sullivan, 787 F. Supp. 921 (N.D.
Calif. 1992); Ribando v. United Airlines, 787 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Andrade v.
Crawford & Co., 786 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ohio 1992); Croce v. V.I.P. Real Estate, 786 F.
Supp. 1141 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); McCormick v. Consolidation Coal Co., 786 F. Supp. 563
(N.D. W. Va. 1992); Sample v. Keystone Carbon Co., 786 F. Supp. 527 (W.D. Pa. 1992);
Reynolds v. Frank, 786 F. Supp. 168 (D. Conn. 1992); Aldana v. Raphael Contractors,
785 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Ind. 1992); McCullough v. Consol. Rail Corp., 785 F. Supp.
1309 (N.D. II. 1992); Parcell v. IBM Corp., 785 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D.N.C. 1992); Conerly
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The Supreme Court has just accepted two cases to decide the ret-
roactivity question. 4
V. PROCEDURAL HURDLES TO THE VINDICATION OF
CIL RIGHTS CLAIMS
Section 112 of the Civil Rights Act of 199195 provides that
the statute of limitations for suits involving seniority systems begins
to run from the time a plaintiff is affected. This provision over-
ruled Lorance v. AT&T Inc.," which had held that the statute ran
from the time the seniority system was adopted.
The Department of Justice opposed the Lorance statute of
limitations rule.97 The statutory solution is fair to plaintiffs, who
may not know that a seniority system affects them until it is ap-
plied to them, to defendants, who do not have to defend a senior-
ity system until it is applied concretely, and to the judicial system,
which need not rule on the system until the dispute is concrete.
The Lorance rule, in contrast, encouraged the premature filing of
lawsuits to contest objections to seniority systems that may be spec-
ulative.
Congress also did not decide the retroactivity question as to
Lorance,98 nor did Congress decide whether the Loranci9  rule
v. CVN Cos., 785 F. Supp. 801 (D. Minn. 1992); Hameister v. Harley-Davidson, 785 F.
Supp. 113 (E.D. Wis. 1992); McLaughlin v. New York, 784 F. Supp. 961 (N.D.N.Y. 1992);
Long v. Carr, 784 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1992); Joyner v. Monier Roof Tile, 784 F.
Supp. 872 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Kimble v. DPCE, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Doe
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 783 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Cook v. Foster Forbes
Glass, 783 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. Mo. 1992); Poston v. Reliable Drug Stores, 783 F. Supp.
1166 (S.D. Ind. 1992); Sanders v. Culinary Workers Union Local No. 226, 783 F. Supp.
531 (D. Nev. 1992); Burchfield v. Derwinski, 782 F. Supp. 532 (D. Colo. 1992); Saltarikos
v. Charter Mfg. Co., 782 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Wis. 1992); Futch v. Stone, 782 F. Supp. 284
(M.D. Pa. 1992); Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 782 F. Supp. 106 (S.D. Ala. 1992); Grahm
v. Bodine Elec. Co., 782 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. I1. 1992); Great Am. Tool & Mfg. Co. v.
Adolph Coors Co., 780 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Colo. 1992); EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Ass'n,
780 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. 11. 1991); Stender v. Lucky Stores, "780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D.
Calif. 1992); Khjandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Va. 1992); King v.
Shelby.Medical Ctr., 779 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F.
Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Hansel v. Public Serv. Co., 778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1991).
94 Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1992), c=-4 granted, No.
92-938, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 1760 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993); Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 968 F.2d
427 (1992), cert. granted, No. 92-757, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 1760 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993).
95 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(2) (Supp. III 1992).
96 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
97 See Brief for the United States at 8, 24, Lorance v. AT&T, 490 U.S. 900 (1989)
(No. 87-1428).
98 The Ninth Circuit avoided the retroactivity question in EEOC v. Local 350,
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should apply to statutes other than Title VII, such as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.
VI. THE RIGHTS OF NON-PARTIES TO CONSENT DECREES
In contrast to section 112 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,1"
where Congress increased the procedural rights of prospective
litigants adversely affected by actions of the employer in setting up
a seniority system, section 108 reduces the rights of litigants. It
seeks to take away their day in court. Section 108 provides that
non-parties to consent decrees cannot challenge them under Title
VII if they had notice and a chance to intervene or were ade-
quately represented by others. 01 This rule overturns Martin v.
W1/ks, 1 2 which held that a judgment or decree does not bind a
third party who is not a party to the litigation.
In Wiks, white firefighters sued the city and the personnel
board, claiming that these two entities denied promotions to the
whites in favor of less qualified black fighters. In this reverse dis-
crimination case, the white firefighters argued that the city and
the board, in reliance on certain consent decrees, were making
promotion decisions that were unconstitutional and in violation of
federal statutory law. The district court precluded the white
firefighters from challenging employment decisions taken pursuant
to various consent decrees, even though these firefighters had not
been parties to the proceedings in which the decrees were en-
tered.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the five-to-four majority, over-
turned the district court, affirmed the Eleventh Circuit, and ruled
that the firefighters should have their day in court. The district
court's decision "contravenes the general rule .that a person can-
not be deprived of his legal rights in a proceeding to which he is
not a party."10 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if
the city, or the personnel board, or the union, wanted to bind the
Plumbers & Pipefitters, No. 90-16810, 1992 WL 373764 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 1992), because
the violation in that case was a continuing facially discriminatory system involving age
discrimination. Lorance was inapplicable to this case because it only determines "when the
limitations period begins to run in a lawsuit arising out of a seniority system not alleged
to be discriminatory on its face or as presently applied." Lorance, 490 U.S. at 903.
99 Cf. EEOC v. City Colleges of Chicago, 944 F.2d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 1991).
100 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (Supp. III 1992).
101 I § 2000e-2.
102 490 U.S. 755 (1989); see, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 3.
103 Wiks, 490 U.S. at 759.
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white firefighters (who were not parties to the consent decree),
then they cannot obligate the white firefighters to intervene; in-
stead, they must join them. The fact that the firefighters could
challenge the consent decree as discriminatory did not mean that
they would win. Wt/s only gave them their day in court.
Congress concluded that mandatory joinder of affected parties
was unreasonable."' ° Many employers and unions also supported
overruling Wiks. °5 That is to be expected, because the only
group that the new legislation adversely affects is the group that is
effectively precluded from challenging an allegedly unconstitution-
al consent decree. Future cases may challenge, on procedural
grounds, the constitutionality of this provision to the extent it
precludes people from challenging a consent decree that affects
them when they were not parties to it and did not receive proper
notice. 06
VII. MIXED MOTIVE DISCRIMINATION
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,"7 the Court considered the
situation where a challenged employment decision resulted from a
mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives."06 The six-justice
majority split four-to-four-to-one in its reasoning. Justice Brennan,
for the plurality, rejected the position that the Justice Department
advocated and concluded that, in a mixed-motive case, the plain-
tiff bears the burden of proving by direct evidence that an im-
permissible criterion was a "substantial factor" in the adverse em-
ployment decision. After that, the burden of persuasion shifts to
the employer to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the same decision would actually have been made even with-
out the unlawful motive."° If the employer would have made
the same decision, without taking plaintiffs sex or race into ac-
count, then the defendant avoids all liability. This principle is
similar to the rule that the Court has applied in mixed motive
cases brought directly under the Equal Protection Clause." 0
104 H.R. REt'. No. 40, supra note 10, at 53, 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 591.
105 Id. at 51-52, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 589-90; see also Brief amicus curiae of EEOC, in
Support of Petitioners, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (No. 87-1614).
106 See e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
107 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
108 Id. at 232.
109 Id. at 261, 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring); of. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel, 958 F.2d
1176, 1181-83 (2d Cir. 1992).
110 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
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Section 107 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991111 reverses
Puice Waterhouse. It allows a plaintiff to prevail even if non-discrimi-
natory motivations exist, and even if the employer would have
taken the same action in spite of its discriminatory purpose. How-
ever, the Act limits the remedy in such cases.112 The employer
does not avoid all liability;, instead, if the employer proves that it
would have taken the same action (such as a refusal to promote
the plaintiff) even in the absence of the improper motivating
factor, then the court may grant declaratory relief, or an injunc-
tion, and attorney's fees and costs "directly attributable" to these
claims. The court, however, cannot award any damages or issue an
order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion,
or payment.'
Thus, the new law authorizes the court to enjoin the employ-
er from future discriminatory practices even if it could not order
the defendant to promote the plaintiff. The reason why the court
can order some relief, in appropriate circumstances, is to recog-
nize that the plaintiff is really a "private attorney general" who is
vindicating public rights, not just his or her private interests.
VIII. EXPERT WITNESS FEES-
In Crawford Fitting Co: v. fT. Gibbons, Inc.,"4 the Court fol-
lowed the traditional American rule and concluded that federal
courts cannot award prevailing parties in civil cases more than
thirty dollars per day in expert witness fees. West Virginia University
Hospital v. Casey"5 applied this rule to the Civil Rights Attorneys'
Fees Award Act of 1976,11' because the law did not contain any
explicit statutory authorization for reimbursement of expert witness
fees. Yet, in many cases, the market rate for expert witnesses is
routinely several hundred dollars per hour.
270 n.21 (1977). On the other hand, if the state maintains a system for invidious purpos-
es, the Court will find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, even though the system was racially neutral when the state adopted it. Rog-
ers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982).
111 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. III 1992).
112 Section 107 provides: "[An unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for an employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice." Id.
113 See § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (B) (i) (ii) (Supp. III 1992).
114 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
115 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
116 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
-....... -... ~..W.'.~ - 4..'....flS...t",..
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In response to judicial requests for statutory authorization," 7
section 113 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that a court,
"in its discretion," may, award those who win civil rights suits rea-
sonable expert witness fees as part of their attorney's fees.1
Congress considered proposals to overturn other Supreme Court
decisions dealing with attorneys' fees, but ultimately included none
of them in the final version of the bill.119
IX. APPLICAnON OVERSEAS
In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,120 the Court refused to
extend the protections of various civil rights statutes, including
Title VII, to American citizens employed abroad by American
companies. The Court also asked for more legislative guidance,
which Congress provided in section 109 of the Civil Rights Act of
117 See, eg., Denny v. Westfield State College, 880 F.2d 1465, 1471-72 (1st Cir. 1989).
118 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. III 1992).
Only the Ninth Circuit has ruled in favor of the retroactivity of any part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, and did so in an expert witness fee case. Davis v. City of San
Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the provision of the Act providing
for expert witness fees in employment discrimination cases applies retroactively).
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit specifically rejected the argument that § 113 should
apply retroactively. See Huey v. Sullivan, 971 F.2d 1362, 1366 n.5 (8th Cir. 1992); Davis v.
Tri-State Mack Distribs., 1992 WL 357795 (D. Ark. Dec. 8, 1992).
119 See Independent Fed.'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (re-
fusing to mandate attorneys' fees for plaintiffs who defend earlier obtained relief from
collateral attack).
Congress also refused to reverse Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), holding that
the court may deny a successful civil rights plaintiff attorneys' fees incurred after the
plaintiff rejected a pretrial offer of settlement, if the relief that plaintiff obtained is less
than the offer.
Finally, Congress refused to overturn Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), stating
that it was proper for the defendant, in settling the case, to require that the plaintiff's
attorney waive his or her statutory right to attorneys' fees. If plaintiff secures nonmone-
tary relief, such as injunctive or declaratory relief, there is no 7a from which plaintiff's
attorney can be paid. Defendant has every incentive to encourage plaintiff to waive the
attorney's fees; the waiver does not harm plaintiff, who has won a successful settlement
and who often cannot afford to pay attorneys' fees. The attorney has the ethical obli-
gation to fight zealously for his or her client, not to fight just for the fees. The problem
is that future plaintiffs will be hurt because future attorneys will be reluctant to under-
take meritorious civil rights litigation, where success is likely, but the resultant attorney's
fees may well be waived. Congress refused to reverse this case, though some state bars
have published ethics opinions concluding that it is unethical for defense counsel to
submit a settlement offer conditioning settlement on the waiver of plaintiff's attorney's
fees. See THOMAs D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERAIMS ON PRO-
SESSIONAL RESPONSIBIIaTY 481-82 (5th ed. 1991).
120 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
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1991.121 Section 109 extends Title VII and Americans with Dis-
abilities Act protections to U.S. citizens employed in foreign coun-
tries by American owned or American controlled companies. To
avoid any conflict in duties, the American law excludes any action
that would violate the law of the foreign workplace.
X. JURY TRIALS IN TITLE VII CASES
Section 1021" provides for jury trials in Title VII cases, over-
ruling a consistent line of precedent going back over a
decade. 12 It also provides for punitive damages but places vari-
ous "caps" or limits on the amount of punitive damages that the
jury may award. These caps set a maximum amount of the sum of
compensatory and punitive damages and are a function of the
number of employees.
124
XI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has had a crucial role to play in realizing
the promise of civil rights for all Americans. The Court, and not
Congress, has had the primary role in interpreting our Bill of
Rights. But when we turn to the statutory framework within which
Congress protects against de facto employment discrimination, Con-
gress should not abdicate its role of making policy and protecting
the statutory rights that it has previously created.
It is inevitable that, when interpreting statutes, the Court will
sometimes make mistakes and fail to follow either the congres-
sional will expressed in the statute or existing at the time that the
Court renders its opinion. The expected response, in such cases, is
for Congress to enact clarifying legislation, to "reverse" various Su-
preme Court decisions. There is nothing unusual or sinister about
these interpretative fumbles, and we should not try to read too
much into them.
12
When Congress enacts clarifying legislation, it is reasonable
for litigators, as well as the Court, to expect Congress to draft lan-
guage that illuminates, simplifies, and, yes, even clarifies, previ-
ously veiled, enigmatic, or cryptic statutes. In enacting the Civil
121 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Supp. III 1992).
122 Id. § 1981a(c)(1).
123 See, eg., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981).
124 Interestingly, the law mandates that the judge "shall not inform the jury of the
limitations described in subsection (b) (3)." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2).
125 But cf Rutherford, supra note 4.
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Rights Act of 1991, Congress cleared up various problems in the
law, but it also avoided solving two very important issues: first, the
meaning of "business necessity," and, second, the question of the
retroactive application of the various provisions that it was enact-
ing.
Congress cannot always foresee problems. The genius of the
common law system is that the courts can deal with these prob-
lems on a case by case basis. But lack of foresight is not the cause
of the two main interpretative problems with the 1991 Act. In an
effort to enact a law with many good provisions, Congress chose
not to tackle two issues because the legislators could not agree on
clarifying language. Instead, Congress relied on so-called "legisla-
tive history," which the lower federal courts dismissed as
"convoluted,"126 a "mine field,"127 or intentionally "crafted" to
be, "ambigu[ous]."'2 s When the legislators themselves caution the
Court to "take with a large grain of salt""2 the various state-
ments inserted into the Congressional Record and carefully placed
in the floor debates, we should not be surprised if the Supreme
Court agrees.
When the Court requires Congress to speak with clarity, it is
not usurping the legislative role. Instead, the judiciary is helping
to implement it, because when Congress speaks clearly, it must
take responsibility for what it does. The voters will know whom to
praise or blame for the resulting legislative handiwork. It is true
that vague legislation accompanied by selective legislative history
allows each side in the legislative battle to tell its constituents that
its interests had prevailed.' The constituents, however, have not
won; instead, the politicians just gave them the right to file a law
suit. Litigation becomes politics by another means. Instead of
deciding whether the civil rights laws should apply retroactively,
Congress debated what the courts would do if Congress did not
126 Gersman v. Group Health Assn, Inc., 975 F.2d 886, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
127 Id. at 891.
128 Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 193 (5th Cir. 1992).
129 137 CONG. REC. S15,325 (1977) (statement of Sen. Danforth); cf. William T.
Mayton, Law Among the Pleonasms: The Futility and Aconstitutionality of Leislative Histmy in
Statu"to Intrprtation, 41 EMORY UJ. 113 (1992)..
130 Jonathan Groner, New Rights Act Ducks Cudal Issut, 14 LEGAL TIMES 1, 18 (Dec.
9, 1991).
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decide the issue.'-" When legislators intentionally avoid deciding
the important questions, the increased transaction costs for the
litigants accompany the increased burdens on the courts.
Similarly, if the Court relies on snippets of legislative history,
focuses on vague statements made on the empty floor of the
House or Senate, and makes law by interpreting what Congress
did not enact rather than what Congress did enact, then the Court
is aiding and abetting an undermining of the legislative process. It
is easy for lobbyists, legislative staff, or solitary legislators to manu-
facture such "legislative history." These people read the same
books and cases on statutory interpretation that the judiciary does.
When the Court accepts manufactured legislative history, it aides
those who thwart open procedures for enacting legislation.
The problems of interpretation that Congress created when it
found itself unable to address certain important issues in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 should not obscure the important contributions
of that law. I will not focus on them, for other commentators at
this Symposium will highlight some of these provisions, and I
should not invade their turf.
I close with one of the lovely stories that the late Justice
Thurgood Marshall liked to tell. Like many of his stories, it had
an important point. There once was an unfortunate gambler, who
lost all of his money in Las Vegas. His luck was down, and when
he went to the rest room, he discovered that there were all pay
toilets, and he did not have even a quarter to his name. A strang-
er gave him a quarter and then left. As the unhappy gambler
started to pick a stall, an occupant exited one, and left the door
open. So the gambler saved his quarter. He felt that his luck was
changing, so before he left Las Vegas, he put that last quarter
into a slot machine, and hoped for a lucky break. It came; he
won thousands and thousands of dollars, invested the money wise-
ly, and eventually became a very wealthy man. Years later, he
hired a private detective to find the man who gave him his first
break, so he could reward and thank him. "You want me to find
the fellow who, years ago, gave you the quarter?" asked the detec-
tive. "No," said the old man. "I don't want to thank the man who
gave me charity, I want to thank the one who opened the doors."
131 Id
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We have a long way to go before we will finally eliminate all
the barriers to discrimination in employment. But there is some
reason to hope. We should not overlook the fact that we are slow-
ly making some progress, as our society seeks equality of opportu-
nity. The long series of civil rights statutes in the last century and
a quarter are about one thing: as Justice Marshall would say, they
are not about charity, they are about opening doors.

